Impact of SIM-Only Plans on Telcos

I recently switched my telco subscription plan from the regular ones to SIM-only plans. How do these SIM-only plans impact the revenue and profitability of the 3 local telcos?

Before we begin, let me explain what are SIM-only plans. As the name implies, SIM-only plans only provide voice, SMS and data but do not come with subsidised handphones. The tables below show the amount of voice, SMS and data for regular and SIM-only plans for M1, the telco which I subscribe to. The last table shows the difference in the amount of voice, SMS and data between the 2 types of plans. As you can see, SIM-only plans have generally the same amount of voice but less SMS and more data than regular plans. As people seldom SMS but rely more on data nowadays, I would argue that SIM-only plans provide better value than regular plans at lower costs!

Regular Plans
Plan	Lite	Lite+	Reg	Reg+	Max	Max+
Monthly Cost	28	42	62	82	102	228
Voice (mins)	100	200	300	400	800	Unlimited
SMS/MMS	500	1000	1200	1500	2000	5000
Data (GB)	0.3	3	4	5	7	13
SIM-Only Plans
Plan	MS+ 15	MS+ 20	MS+ 30	MS+ 45	MS+ 75	MS+ 125
Monthly Cost	15	20	30	45	75	125
Voice (mins)	100	150	300	400	800	Unlimited
SMS/MMS	600	800	1000	1200	2000	Unlimited
Data (GB)	1	4	6	8	13	20
Differences
Monthly Cost	-13	-22	-32	-37	-27	-103
Voice (mins)	0	-50	0	0	0	0
SMS/MMS	100	-200	-200	-300	0	Unlimited
Data (GB)	0.7	1	2	3	6	7

What is the impact of SIM-only plans on telco's revenues? We have to assume a particular handset to illustrate the impact. Let us use Samsung S7 as the handset. If you purchase it under the regular plans, the price you pay ranges from $608 to $0, depending on which plan you choose. This sale of handset contributes to the overall revenue of the telco. However, for SIM-only plans, there is no sale of handset, so handset sale no longer contributes to the overall revenue. Not only that, the service revenue is also lower. The table below shows the revenue impact of SIM-only plans. Using Lite/ mySIM+ (MS+) 15 plans as an example, the total revenue over a 24-month period is $1280 under the regular plan, but only $360 under the SIM-only plan. The decline in revenue is $920, or 72% of the revenue under the regular plan! As we move towards the more expensive plans, the percentage decline becomes lower. Thus, we can expect telco revenue to drop, depending on how many people switch to SIM-only plans.

	Lite	Lite+	Reg	Reg+	Max	Max+
	MS+ 15	MS+ 20	MS+ 30	MS+ 45	MS+ 75	MS+ 125
Handset Price
Regular	608	458	128	58	0	0
SIM-Only	898	898	898	898	898	898
Total Revenue
Regular	1280	1466	1616	2026	2448	5472
SIM-Only	360	480	720	1080	1800	3000
Difference	-920	-986	-896	-946	-648	-2472
% Difference	-72%	-67%	-55%	-47%	-26%	-45%

For M1, the expected decline in revenue shows up in their latest financial statement for FY2016 released last week. Fig. 1 below shows that handset sales dropped by 23.7% in FY2016 and mobile telco revenue dropped by 4.2% despite the total no. of mobile customers rising by 4.7%! Likewise, Fig. 2 below shows that the Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) dropped by 6.0%.

Fig. 1: M1's Revenue

Fig. 2: M1's ARPU

Having said the above, please note that the reasons M1 gave for the decline in net profit were lower IDD and roaming revenue, higher handset subsidy and higher depreciation and amortisation. So, perhaps not many people switched over to SIM-only plans.

Although revenue is expected to drop with SIM-only plans, if the cost of sales drop correspondingly, the impact to profit would not be significant. Here, I will attempt to estimate the profit impact from SIM-only plans. A few assumptions need to be made. Firstly, I will assume that M1 is a pure mobile telco company, even though it also has international call services and fixed services, which together constitute 21% of its service revenue in FY2016.

In FY2016, M1 reported gross profit of $180.0M on total revenue of $1,060.9M, giving it a profit margin of 17.0% (Based on FY2014 financial results, which is before M1's launch of SIM-only plans in Jul 2015, the gross profit margin was 20.4%. We will use the more conservative and latest figure of 17.0% in this analysis). Since this profit margin includes both the sale of handsets and mobile telco services, it is assumed to be the profit margin for the regular plans.

	Overall	Handset	Service
Revenue	1060.9	255.4	805.5
Expenses	880.9	343.9	537.0
Gross Profit	180.0	-88.5	268.5
% Profit	17.0%	-34.7%	33.3%

A breakdown of the revenue and expenses shows that handset sales contributed $255.4M to the overall revenue and $343.9M to the costs. In other words, M1 subsidised $88.5M for the sale of handsets to its regular plan customers. Removing the revenue and expenses from handset sales, the service revenue is $805.5M and the cost of service is $537.0M, giving it a gross profit of $268.5M or a profit margin of 33.3% on mobile telco services alone. This is assumed to be the profit margin for SIM-only plans, since they only provide mobile telco services.

Finally, I will further assume that the profit margins of 17.0% and 33.3% apply for all regular and SIM-only plans respectively, which is likely to be incorrect. I understand that a lot of assumptions have been made here, but these assumptions provide at least a starting point for analysing the impact of SIM-only plans on telco profitability. If you have better figures, please let me know.

Applying these profit margins to the revenue discussed above, the gross profit for the various plans are shown in the table below.

	Lite	Lite+	Reg	Reg+	Max	Max+
	MS+ 15	MS+ 20	MS+ 30	MS+ 45	MS+ 75	MS+ 125
Gross Profit
Regular	217	249	274	344	415	928
SIM-Only	120	160	240	360	600	1000
Difference	-97	-89	-34	16	185	72
% Difference	-45%	-36%	-12%	5%	44%	8%

Using the Lite/ MS+ 15 plans as an example, the gross profit for the regular plan is $217 (17.0% x $1280) but only $120 (33.3% x $360) for the SIM-only plan. The difference is $97 or 45% of the gross profit of the regular plan. However, as we move towards the more expensive plans, this difference turns from a loss into a profit! The reason is pure mobile telco services has a higher profit margin. Thus, the more expensive the plan is, the more profit the telco makes!

The same analysis repeated for iPhone 7 (128GB) is shown below. Likewise, it shows that there is a significant drop in revenue but the impact to profit depends on which plan the subscriber chooses.

	Lite	Lite+	Reg	Reg+	Max	Max+
	MS+ 15	MS+ 20	MS+ 30	MS+ 45	MS+ 75	MS+ 125
Handset Price
Regular	880	745	560	380	190	0
SIM-Only	1218	1218	1218	1218	1218	1218
Total Revenue
Regular	1552	1753	2048	2348	2638	5472
SIM-Only	360	480	720	1080	1800	3000
Difference	-1192	-1273	-1328	-1268	-838	-2472
% Difference	-77%	-73%	-65%	-54%	-32%	-45%
Gross Profit
Regular	263	297	347	398	448	928
SIM-Only	120	160	240	360	600	1000
Difference	-143	-137	-107	-38	152	72
% Difference	-54%	-46%	-31%	-10%	34%	8%

So, the next 2 big questions are: (1) how many people will choose to switch from regular plans to SIM-only plans, and (2) which plans are they on currently?

I do not have much insights on these 2 questions. On the first question, my opinion is that people who choose to switch include those who are cost-conscious, do not need an expensive phone and/or tired of upgrading phones every 2 years. The possible profiles of these groups of people would be the elderly and young children (if they are not already on the pre-paid plans). To cut a long story short, I do not think a lot of people will switch.

Another point to note is that M1 launched the SIM-only plans in Jul 2015. Since the typical contract period is 2 years, we are approximately 75% into the first renewal cycle. Nevertheless, it is also possible that some subscribers could have missed the SIM-only plans when they previously renewed and choose to make the switch in the next cycle.

On the second question, based on Fig. 2 above, the ARPU is $58, which is closest to the Reg plan that costs $62 per month. For this plan, the SIM-only equivalent will result in lower profit based on the analysis for Samsung S7 and iPhone 7 (128GB) above.

Hence, in conclusion, for each subscriber who chooses to switch, SIM-only plans will result in a significant drop in revenue. The impact to profit is also negative but smaller than the decline in revenue. However, the no. of subscribers who choose to switch to SIM-only plans is likely to be small.

P.S. I am vested in M1.


See related blog posts:

• Will SIM-Only Plans Cannibalise Regular Telco Plans?
• Will MVNOs Cannibalise Telcos' Business?
• Impact of Data Upsize Plans on Telcos

A Prediction About Properties 13 Years Ago

Before I became a blogger in 2012, I contributed to the Straits Times (ST) Forum Page once in a blue moon. My first letter was written in Dec 2004 and discussed the issue of whether downgrading homes was a viable means of providing for retirement. I was 29 that year. Certainly, I was not thinking of retirement then, but what aroused my interest a few years earlier was whether properties could be a viable investment for me. That led me to study how the demographics of Singapore would change in the 35 years from the time I thought of the question to the time I would retire. My conclusion was the demographics was favourable for the 1st half of the 35 years and unfavourable for the 2nd half of the 35 years. The main issues were the low birth rate and greying population in Singapore. Since I had to live in one house for the entire 35 years (and more), I probably would not profit from any property investment over the entire period. Thus, I dropped the idea of buying a private property. 

In Dec 2004, ST ran a special report on retirement and one of the methods mentioned was to downgrade their homes. Since I had thought about the issue and I believed not many people had considered demographics changes in their planning then, I decided to drop a letter to ST Forum Page. In that letter, I mentioned that due to demographic changes, property sellers would progressively increase relative to buyers and eventually outnumber them in 2017. The analysis behind the letter is discussed in greater details in Properties.

Every 5 years, I would update my analysis based on the latest demographics figures to check if there are any changes to the above conclusion. The last update was in 2013, after the release of the Population White Paper and Land Use Plan (see Properties, the Population White Paper and the Land Use Plan). While the year sellers would begin to outnumber buyers has been pushed further from 2017 till 2020, the broad conclusion from 13 years ago remains unchanged: that sellers will eventually outnumber buyers and property investors are facing a significant headwind from demographics in the long run.

Just a personal note, I believed too much in my own analysis and did not recognise that even if there are no profits to be made over the entire 35-year investment period, it is possible to profit from the 1st half of the period by buying properties or property shares. In fact, I even sold Ho Bee at $0.215 in 2003 and did not pick up Chip Eng Seng in 2003/2004 when it was languishing at $0.10! That is my desserts for being a smart alec! 

The one very expensive lesson that I learnt from this episode is that even though the long-term analysis might point in a certain direction, the short- or medium-term analysis might point in an entirely different direction. I should analyse the short-, medium- and long-term situations instead of being fixated by the long-term conclusion.

See related blog posts:

• Properties
• Properties, the Population White Paper and the Land Use Plan
• Properties and the Arrival of Robots and Automation

Another Year That Ends with 7

You probably have heard of the folklore -- whenever the year ends with 7, the stock market would crash. In 1987, Dow Jones Industrial Average went through the Black Monday in which it crashed 22.6% in a single day on 19 Oct 1987. Stock markets worldwide followed suit. In 1997, Asia went through the Asian Financial Crisis which did not end until nearly 2 years later. The STI went from 2,216.79 on 31 Dec 1996 to 805.04 on 4 Sep 1998, which is a precipitious drop of 64%! Fig. 1 below shows the extent of the crash during that period.

Fig. 1: STI Crash in 1997

In 2007, it was US' turn to experience a financial crisis, which eventually inflicted all other countries in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The stock market crash did not begin at the start of 2007, but sometime in Oct 2007 and ended only 1.5 years later. From 3,875.77 on 11 Oct 2007, the STI crashed until it bottomed out at 1,456.95 on 9 Mar 2009 for a steep drop of 62%! Fig. 2 below shows the crash during that period. In fact, 3,875.77 remains the all-time high of STI. For the next 10 years afterwards, the STI never came close to reaching this level.

Fig. 2: STI Crash in 2007

It is 2017 this year, another year that ends with 7. Will history repeat itself and the stock market experience another spectacular crash again?

Personally, I have experienced the crash of 1987, 1997 and 2007. In 1987, I was helping my father to monitor stock prices when he was at work. On that fateful day (20 Oct 1987), I saw prices gapping down by 33% when the market resumed trading from its lunch break. It was such a shock that it became the moment when I knew that the stock market was destined to be a part of my life (see Confessions of a Serious Investor). 

In 1997, I was 1 year away from graduating from university. Being the "smart" guy in the family, I had recommended my father to buy a certain financial stock that had fallen from $3 to $0.75. We never saw the money on this stock again. This crash had the heaviest impact on my family. Because of the financial crisis, Malaysia imposed capital controls, resulting in suspension of trading of all Malaysian stocks listed on the SGX Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) market. All shares were frozen and transferred to the Malaysian stock market. They were only released a few years later. By then, they were mostly worthless. 

In 2007, I was investing with my own money for 9 years when the GFC happened. At the start of 2007, I was uneasy with the speculative fever over structured warrants that pushed stock prices to high levels. Unadjusted for corporate actions, Capitaland reached $8.60, Ezra $6.75, NOL $5.45, SGX $15.40, SIA $19.30, Swiber $3.66! Unfortunately, the money that I pulled out from stocks went into REITs and high-yield business/ shipping trusts, such as FirstShip, Rickmers, MacCookPropSec, etc. which crashed equally significantly. At the depth of the crisis, I estimated I was sitting on paper loss of about 65%! Undaunted, I liquidated half of my bank preference shares and pumped fresh money into the stock market. The market recovered and I recouped all my losses and made some money (see Behind Every Successful Bear Market Recovery is A Cash-Like Instrument).

It is 2017, do I believe in the folklore that the market would crash spectacularly again? I respect folklore, especially having gone through 3 severe market crashes previously, but I needed evidence that a crash is likely, such as sky-high stock prices like the case in 2007. Thus, in the later half of 2016, I was wondering what would cause a crash to materialise. The realisation came when the market did not crash after Brexit happened in Jun 2016: the massive liquidity injected by central banks around the world was propping up asset prices, but that did not help the many companies in many industries which are instead facing poor business and/or low margins, with some companies entering judicial management (see What Have We Got After 8 Years of Easy Money?). Although there is euphoria after the US presidential election that Trump would increase infrastructure spending, cut taxes and regulations and thus speed up the recovery of the economy, he is at the same time advocating protectionist trade policies, potentially triggering trade wars with other countries. Furthermore, increased infrastructure spending would lead to inflation and interest rates rising more rapidly. There is also the risk of capital flight out of non-US countries into US, making US dollar debt burdens more heavy for companies in Asia (see Making America Great Again and Its Impact to Asia). 

Thus, I am not optimistic about the stock market for 2017 and have been shoring up cash positions whenever possible. The crash may or may not happen. But if it happens, I am prepared.

See related blog posts:

• No, the Stock Market Did Not Crash in 2017
• What Have We Got After 8 Years of Easy Money?
• Making America Great Again and Its Impact to Asia

Betting Against the STI Component Stock Changes

Buying and holding a stock index is considered as passive investing. However, the STI is not entirely passive. Every quarter, the STI would be reviewed to determine whether certain stocks should be dropped from or added to the index. This can be likened to active stock selection. How have the stock selections of STI of the past 3 years performed?

Over the past 3 years, there have been 6 changes to the STI component stocks. 1 of them is a forced change, as CapitaMalls Asia (CMA) was privatised and its place in the STI was taken over by Ascendas REIT. All the other 5 changes are voluntary changes. The performance of the stocks removed from the index since their removal till 30 Dec 2016 is shown below.

Stock	Replacement Date	Price Then	Price 30/12/16	% Changes	Replacement
CMA	04 Jun 14	2.35	NA	NA	A-Reit
JMH	21 Sep 15	47.00	55.25	18%	SATS/UOL/YZJ
JSH	21 Sep 15	27.01	33.20	23%	SATS/UOL/YZJ
Olam	21 Sep 15	2.04	1.97	-3%	SATS/UOL/YZJ
Noble	21 Mar 16	0.22	0.17	-21%	CCT
SembMar	19 Sep 16	1.25	1.38	10%	JMH
Average				5.3%

Please note that the price of Noble has been adjusted for a 1-for-1 rights issue at $0.11 in Jun 2016. The unadjusted price before the removal date is $0.32.

Among the 5 stocks removed from the index, 3 have gone on to register double digit gains in stock price, one is esentially flat and another is down by double digits. Overall, this portfolio of discarded index stocks have gained by 5.3% as at 30 Dec 2016.

The performance of the stocks added to the index since their addition till 30 Dec 2016 is shown below.

Stock	Replacement Date	Price Then	Price 30/12/16	% Changes	Replacement
A-Reit	04 Jun 14	2.38	2.27	-5%	CMA
SATS	21 Sep 15	3.80	4.85	28%	JMH/JSH/Olam
UOL	21 Sep 15	6.02	5.99	0%	JMH/JSH/Olam
YZJ	21 Sep 15	1.17	0.81	-30%	JMH/JSH/Olam
CCT	21 Mar 16	1.47	1.48	1%	Noble
JMH	19 Sep 16	60.14	55.25	-8%	SembMar
Average				-2.6%

Among the 6 stocks added to the index, 3 are essentially flat, registering less than 5% gain or loss in stock price. 1 has outperformed with a 28% gain, but it is offset by another which underperformed with a 30% loss. Overall, this portfolio of added index stocks has lost 2.6%.

Please note that this analysis does not consider dividends. Among the 6 added stocks, 2 of them are REITs, which pay handsome dividends but fluctuate little in stock price. This partly explains why the portfolio of added index stocks is essentially flat.

If you had bought the discarded index stocks and sold the added index stocks, you would have gained 5.3% + 2.6% or 7.9%. Note that this is a market-neutral portfolio; you are neither long nor short the market. In other words, this 7.9% gain is alpha! It is not a gain because of a correct bet on the direction of the market. It is a gain independent of where the market moved! (Again, please note that dividends are not considered in this analysis.)

If you notice carefully, there is 1 stock that appears in both the discarded and added index stock lists. The stock is Jardine Matheson Holdings (JMH). When it was dropped from the index in Sep 2015, it price was $47.00. When it was added back to the index a year later, it had risen to $60.14. Its price as at end Dec 2016 was $55.25. Thus, on the 1 occasion when the STI carried out "market-timing", it performed poorly as well!

The main reason for the overperformance of discarded index stocks and underperformance of added index stocks is because changes to the STI component stocks are announced in advance. Hence, investors would have sold the discarded stocks and bought the added stocks before the changes take place, resulting in the discarded stocks outperforming and the added stocks underperforming subsequently. Nevertheless, the fact remains that this is a market inefficiency and investors who bet against the changes stand to profit from it.

In conclusion, the STI is not a very good stock picker. Investors who buy and hold the STI should be aware that changes to the STI component stocks would impact their performance to some extent. Also, betting against the STI component stock changes might be a fairly profitable move.


See related blog posts:

• The Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2017
• Who Says You Can't Beat the Index?
• The Bounceback Portfolio of STI

The Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2017

The Dogs and Puppies of STI is an annual blog series that I try to update at the start of every year. It can be very time-consuming to crunch all the data and analyse their performance relative to the STI, especially since there is only a very short time window between the end of the previous year and the start of trading in the new year. Nevertheless, I try to do my best every year. Here is the edition for 2017 and a review of the performance of the Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2016.
 
To recap, the Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2016 are as follows (see The Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2016 for more info):

Puppies of STI 2016

• A-Reit
• Capitaland Mall Trust
• HPH Trust
• SembMar
• ST Engineering

Other Dogs of STI 2016

• Keppel Corp
• SembCorp
• SPH
• Starhub
• UOB

You might have noticed that SembMar continues to be included as part of the Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2016 even though it was dropped from the STI in Sep 2016. This is because the concept behind the Dogs of the Dow theory is to buy the identified stocks and hold them for 1 year. Hence, its place among the Dogs and Puppies of STI is unaffected. From this year onwards, it will no longer be contending to be part of the Dogs and Puppies of STI.

How did the Dogs and Puppies perform in 2016? The results are shown below.

	Price 31/12/15	Price 31/12/16	Div	Div Yield	Return (excl. Div)	Return (incl. Div)
Puppies
A-Reit	$2.28	$2.27	17.70	7.8%	-0.4%	7.3%
CapitaMall	$1.93	$1.89	11.23	5.8%	-2.3%	3.5%
HPH Trust	$0.53	$0.44	4.87	9.2%	-17.9%	-8.7%
SembMar	$1.75	$1.38	12.00	6.9%	-21.1%	-14.3%
ST Engg	$3.01	$3.23	16.00	5.3%	7.3%	12.6%
Non-Puppies
Kep Corp	$6.51	$5.79	48.00	7.4%	-11.1%	-3.7%
SembCorp	$3.05	$2.85	16.00	5.2%	-6.6%	-1.3%
SPH	$3.94	$3.53	20.00	5.1%	-10.4%	-5.3%
StarHub	$3.70	$2.81	20.00	5.4%	-24.1%	-18.6%
UOB	$19.61	$20.40	110.00	5.6%	4.0%	9.6%
Dogs				6.4%	-8.3%	-1.9%
Puppies				7.0%	-6.9%	0.1%
STI	2882.73	2880.76	93.00	3.2%	-0.1%	3.2%

As shown above, both the Dogs and Puppies underperformed the STI in 2016. Inclusive of dividends, the Dogs returned -1.9% while the Puppies were almost unchanged at 0.1%. Both are worse than STI's 3.2%. Excluding dividends, the Dogs and Puppies did even worse. The Dogs returned -8.3% while the Puppies returned -6.9%, which is worse than STI's -0.1%. 

The underperformance of the Dogs and Puppies relative to STI in 2016 reversed the overperformance in 2015. This underperformance is unexpected, as STI was virtually unchanged if dividends were not considered. Since the Dogs and Puppies contain REITs that pay high dividends, the Dogs and Puppies should in theory outperform the STI after the dividends are considered.

If you have been following this annual series of blog posts, you would know that I am not a fan of having REITs included in the STI. There are now 4 REITs/ business trusts in the STI, namely, A-Reit, Capitaland Comm Trust, Capitaland Mall Trust and HPH Trust. Since REITs/ business trusts pay high dividends, they naturally dominate the Dogs and Puppies.

For 2016, what would be the performance of the Dogs and Puppies if the REITs/ business trusts were excluded? The performance is as shown in the table below.

	Price 31/12/15	Price 31/12/16	Div	Div Yield	Return (excl. Div)	Return (incl. Div)
Puppies
SembCorp	$3.05	$2.85	16.00	5.2%	-6.6%	-1.3%
SembMar	$1.75	$1.38	12.00	6.9%	-21.1%	-14.3%
SingTel	$3.70	$3.65	17.50	4.7%	-1.4%	3.4%
ST Engg	$3.01	$3.23	16.00	5.3%	7.3%	12.6%
YZJ	$1.11	$0.82	5.50	5.0%	-26.2%	-21.3%
Non-Puppies
Kep Corp	$6.51	$5.79	48.00	7.4%	-11.1%	-3.7%
OCBC Bk	$8.80	$8.92	36.00	4.1%	1.4%	5.5%
SPH	$3.94	$3.53	20.00	5.1%	-10.4%	-5.3%
StarHub	$3.70	$2.81	20.00	5.4%	-24.1%	-18.6%
UOB	$19.61	$20.40	110.00	5.6%	4.0%	9.6%
Dogs				5.5%	-8.8%	-3.3%
Puppies				5.4%	-9.6%	-4.2%
STI	2882.73	2880.76	93.00	3.2%	-0.1%	3.2%

SingTel and Yangzijiang will take the places of A-Reit, Capitaland Mall Trust and HPH Trust among the Puppies. SembCorp will turn from a Dog into a Puppy and OCBC will take its place as a Dog. The No-REIT Dogs and Puppies performed even worse than the standard version. Inclusive of dividends, YZJ dropped by 21.3%, pulling down the performance of Dogs and Puppies to -3.3% and -4.2% respectively. Thus, for the second year in a row, the original Dogs and Puppies outperformed the No-REIT Dogs and Puppies. Perhaps the original Dogs of Dow theory should not be tinkered with. 

Moving on to 2017, the table below shows the dividend yields of STI component stocks in descending order:

Counter	Div (cents)	Price 31/12/16	Div Yield	Remarks
HPH Trust US$	4.19	$0.44	9.64%	Puppy
StarHub	20.00	$2.81	7.12%	Dog
CapitaMall	11.13	$1.89	5.90%	Puppy
CapitaComm	8.70	$1.48	5.88%	Puppy
YZJ	4.50	$0.82	5.52%	Puppy
A-Reit	12.19	$2.27	5.37%	Puppy
Kep Corp	30.00	$5.79	5.18%	Dog
SPH	18.00	$3.53	5.10%	Dog
SingTel	17.50	$3.65	4.79%	Dog
ST Engg	15.00	$3.23	4.64%	Dog
SIA	44.00	$9.67	4.55%
OCBC Bk	36.00	$8.92	4.04%
SGX	28.00	$7.16	3.91%
ComfortDelGro	9.25	$2.47	3.74%
SIA Engg	12.00	$3.37	3.56%
SembCorp	10.00	$2.85	3.51%
DBS	60.00	$17.34	3.46%
UOB	70.00	$20.40	3.43%
Genting SP	3.00	$0.91	3.31%
SATS	16.00	$4.85	3.30%
ThaiBev	2.67	$0.85	3.14%
HKLand US$	19.00	$6.33	3.00%
Capitaland	9.00	$3.02	2.98%
GLP	6.00	$2.20	2.73%
JMH 400US$	145.00	$55.25	2.62%
UOL	15.00	$5.99	2.50%
Wilmar	8.00	$3.59	2.23%
CityDev	16.00	$8.28	1.93%
Jardine C&C	69.00	$41.23	1.67%
GoldenAgri	0.50	$0.43	1.17%

Just to recap, the Dogs of STI are the 10 highest-yielding dividend stocks in the STI, while the Puppies of STI are the 5 lowest-priced stocks among the Dogs of STI. Thus, the Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2017 are as follows:

Puppies of STI 2017

• A-Reit
• Capitaland Comm Trust
• Capitaland Mall Trust
• HPH Trust
• Yangzijiang

Other Dogs of STI 2017

• Keppel Corp
• SingTel
• SPH
• Starhub
• ST Engineering

So far, since 2014, STI has won twice while the Dogs & Puppies have won 1 time. STI has won when it rose (2014) or was flat (2016) and lost when it fell (2015). Which will win in 2017? Let us see in 2017!


See related blog posts:

• The Dogs and Puppies of STI
• The Dogs and Puppies of STI for 2016
• Who Says You Can't Beat the Index?